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In an era of greater political transparency, where the work of health service provider organizations, doctors and other clinicians comes under scrutiny on a systematic basis, parliamentarians have the opportunity to examine results, make suggestions for improvement and make better informed decisions. Performance metrics have major potential significance as resources for enabling an enhancement of the democratic process. For example intelligent use of performance metrics derived evidence, can shift the asymmetric balance in knowledge between doctors, government and the public concerning clinical activities. In an ‘ideal’ or naïve model of representative democracy, parliaments would decide in the general interest about health services matters and well-informed citizens would choose good representatives on the basis of their capacity to make rational decisions. The ability of parliamentarians to access and use performance metrics and other types of evidence would underpin their judgments, which inevitably would be much influenced by the ‘standard’ concepts of performance underpinning the production of performance metrics. The implications of standardized concepts of performance being accepted by elected representatives create potential worries for supporters of pluralist forms of democracy. 
Performance metrics may also help realise the practice of transparent government. In an idealized world metrics would also guide government ministers in implementing policy decisions endorsed by a knowledgeable parliament. For proponents of transparent government performance metrics based around unambiguous performance concepts, facilitates the ‘reading’ of the policy process by interested parties outside of government. In reality the promise of transparent government is not yet proven and revealing the performance of public services through publicly accessible sets of performance metrics, however systematic in their coverage, is not enough in itself enough to remedy democratic deficits. Sterk & Bouckaert (2006) suggest there may be even be unintended negative consequences associated with the transparency motivated budget reforms they have examined in a comparative study of four countries. They conclude that despite the fact that the performance budgeting reforms had the purpose to increase transparency of the budget; the complexity of the budgeting process was also increased during the same policy phase. Hard to grasp technical accounting reforms combined with transparency reforms appeared to have cancelled out any potential to increase usage by parliamentarians. The current study is also intended to add to the literature dealing with such emergent paradoxes in the application of NPM.  (Hood & Peters, 2004) As O’Neil (2006) has observed in relation to transparency, little of consequence may be gained unless there are effective mechanisms of communication which cause stakeholders to actually examine the records of either government or private institutions. Taking this criticism of the transparency boom one stage further, we should also question the impact of performance metrics for democracy, even if they are effectively communicated to parliamentarians when there is also scant evidence of their use in the pursuit of oversight functions. 

While the academic community has made considerable progress in relation to researching the growth in performance management over the past twenty years, much of the work has been focused on the describing, categorizing or probing the accuracy of performance measures. (Armstrong, 2001; Holzer & Yang, 2004; Pollitt 2006; Boyne, Meier, O'Toole, & Walker, 2006).  Pollitt (2005) concluded in a recent review of published evidence that use of performance metrics is patchy and that much of what has been established suggests that evaluations, performance reports and audits are in fact seldom highly valued by politicians. A literature review conducted by Van de Walle & Boivard  (2007) also found little evidence to confirm strong interest in perforomance metrics from politicians.  
 
 In addition to addressing a general problem with the impact of performance metrics on the democratic process, the project is also filling a more specific gap in knowledge relating to the uses that are made of healthcare related performance metrics by parliamentarians in the context of the Scottish Parliament’s oversight of the National Health Service (NHS) and community care.  In spite of a very active research community with an interest in healthcare performance in the United Kingdom, surprisingly little is known about the use of performance metrics in the process of exercising democratic control over the NHS. The group of politicians chosen for the study are members past and present of the Scottish Parliament Health and Community Care Committee (reconstituted as the Health and Sport Committee in 2007). The Committee has been in operation from the opening of the Parliament in 1999. 









On the basis of existing knowledge it was assumed that the interest of parliamentarians is likely to be less managerialist in character than that of government ministers, beyond this basic conclusion a number of ways in which to categorise modes of usage are initially apparent. Some basic propositions guided initial thoughts on how to learn more about use of performance metrics. Referring to the business of the Scottish Parliament there is ‘process use’, where for example MSPS use metrics in the course of scrutinising a bill. There is also ‘discursive’ usage which is when metrics are employed in more general policy terms, rather than in relation to a specific piece of parliamentary work. There is also form of usage which we can describe as ‘instrumental’. In this case parliamentarians will in the short term be using metrics to directly inform a decision, ask a question, challenge a decision or support a similar type of political action. There are also likely to be cases where parliamentarians are less directly and on a longer time scale ‘enlightened’ about a policy issue through reference to metrics. (Weiss, 1979; Preskill and Torres, 2000). 

There may an inherent political attraction for parliamentarians with careers to build, or for political parties pursuing an adversarial role, in using metrics as ‘ammunition’ in relation to an issue of controversy. (Weiss, 1973). Freed of managerial responsibilities MSPs use of metrics may well be opportunistic and at times partisan. Parliamentarians may tend to resort to metrics once an issue has attracted media attention. (Callaghan and Schnell 2001). The role of pressure groups in drawing attention to performance metrics may also be significant. It is to be anticipated that parliamentarians will have a varied experience of using performance metrics and many will have reasons for not using them to any great extent at all. Time constraints and the pressure to absorb large amounts of other information may be cited as reasons for not using metrics. 

Literature review and research design

A literature review identified six empirical studies whose subject matter was sufficiently close to the problem of parliamentarians as users of performance metrics to merit detailed examination.​[1]​  In order of publication  Ezzamel, Hyndman, Johnsen, Lapsley, & Pallot, 2004 examined parliamentarians and accounting information use in four different jursdictions, ter Bogt, 2004, examined Dutch aldermen’s use of performance information, Ho 2005 investigated the degree to which performance measurement mattered to mayors of mid-western towns in the USA, Sterk & Bouckaert, 2006, dealt with the problem of measuring the impact of budget reform based information enhancments on parliamentary behaviour in four selected countries and Johnson & Talbot, 2007, studied the extent to which performance information is being used by the United Kingdom parliament to challenge the executive and  Askim ( 2007) analysed the behavior of Norwegian local councilors with reference to performance information. Table 1. Below, identifies methodological features, notable findings, conceptual insights and limitations evident in the four studies. This review has been used to inform the research design of the current project and derive specific research questions.
 
Methods
The studies reviewed employed a mixture of methods for gathering data. In line with the research designs followed by Johnson and Talbot and Sterk and Bouckaert a two phase approach has been adopted for the current study, involving a content analysis of relevant documents prior to interviews with performance metrics users taking place. It is this first phase of the project which is reported in the current paper. As was the case with the Johnson and Talbot study a longitudinal approach, in this case eight years, is being followed. A longitudinal approach allows for developments in committee approach and individual behaviour to be followed and set in the context of policy change.  The current project examines parliamentarians who are either current or past members of the Committee. It is anticipated that a fuller picture will emerge of attitudes to HPMs if both current and past members of the committee are interviewed.

Ho, Johnson and Talbot and Bogt and Askim all used surveys to collect data. Ho’s study employed a large sample (639) and achieved a reasonable response rate (39%) in line with what could reasonably have been hoped for given the subjects. Bogt’s project secured a very similar response rate from roughly the same sample size. Johnson and Talbot surveyed 241Members of Parliament but only received a 17% response. Askim was notably more successful in securing a 50% response rate from a sample of 1500. Unfortunately in assessing the viability of this method, logic suggests there was a strong likelihood that the responders were more interested or experienced in using in performance information than the non-responders. It is unlikely that a higher response rate could be anticipated in a postal survey of Scottish parliamentarians. 

There is also the standard problem with a questionnaire based survey, where a response is likely to be hard to secure, in that a limit is placed on how much actual thought questions demand of respondents. For that reason questions need to be relatively easy to answer. The closed question solution used in the three questionnaire based studies, carries an inherent risk of distorting respondents views on performance information. For example Ho’s questions to a certain extent presuppose that respondents accept there is an instrumental service quality enhancing purpose in using performance information and prejudge what will be of importance to the mayors surveyed. Askim noted the problem of establishing that respondents understand what is meant by performance information. For example some Norwegian councilors might not differentiate between performance information and inputs data. Askim provided a brief definition and pre-tested this with a number of subjects. In the current study the broad scope of performance management, the need to deal with process, output and outcomes and the sheer number of health and community care performance metrics in circulation would have made a questionnaire communicated definition unworkable. 





In deciding on the subject focus of the current project a number of useful observations were made on the four studies under review. Ezzamel and colleagues conducted interviews with 58 parliamentarians, ministers, audit agency officers and advisers. The Ho study examines elected mayors who are operating in a part-executive, part-executive oversight capacity, in the sense that they take decisions and also call directors of city services to account. Bogt studied aldermen who similarly operate as an executive and as an oversight group in the context of Dutch municipalities. Johnson and Talbot researched the user behaviour of British Members of Parliament. Here select committees members were chosen as the ‘users’ of performance rather than a random selection of individual members of parliament. This followed logically from the authors’ appreciation of recent parliamentary reforms. Since select committees were assigned a set of core tasks under the House of Commons modernization programme in 2002, they have been obliged to examine metrics and targets contained in PSAs as part of their remit.  The Sterk and Bouckaert study focused on the public service experts associated with budget reforms, rather than the parliamentarians themselves.   Their findings therefore relate to opinions of how performance information was used by parliamentarians. Askim surveyed well over 13% of the total population of Norwegian local councilors. In taking the current study forward it was decided that the subjects to be examined should be parliamentarians whose role was exclusively confined to scrutiny of the executive. In other words like Johnson and Talbot’s Westminster Select Committee members, they should themselves have no executive decision making responsibilities as members of the government. This choice of subjects removes a certain ambiguity as to the role being played by performance metrics, which could confuse analysis and conclusions. 

Source of performance metrics




Ezzamel, Hyndman, Johnsen, Lapsley, & Pallot published their study in 2004. They wished to assess the extent to which accounting information defined to include both financial and performance data, had been used by the executive and members of the three devolved  parliaments in the United Kingdom. Ezzamel et al concluded that the devolved parliaments in the United Kingdom had achieved a significant degree of transparency and openness in respect of budgetary and accounting information. They were not in a position to offer evidence as to the use to which transparency and openness were put to by parliamentarians.  They did however establish that knowledge of accounting practices broadly defined to include performance was fairly limited amongst parliamentarians. Their respondents indicated that information overload is a factor for parliamentarians. Parliamentarians they discovered tended to prefer ‘rich information’ channeled through face to face contacts rather than look for information contained in ‘technical’ written formats.  The Ho and Bogt studies attempted to examine the behavioural basis of why performance metrics were used. Bogt found that aldermen most frequently receive information during informal, verbal consultations with top managers, with slightly less information being provided by formal meetings and consultations with the same managers. In general, all aldermen seemed to prefer rich, verbal information to sources of written information, probably because they work in a relatively complex and uncertain political environment. In the context of the current study it is important to note that parliamentarians as defined are outside government and will be largely excluded from the departmental driven rich information loop, but on the other hand are likely to meet frequently with NHS and social services managers in their constituencies, who may be their sources of rich information. They may also have personal contacts with performance metrics producers outside the central government loop. Bogt’s study reported that alderman are also draw on signals from and consultations with citizens and companies, news in various information media, signals from members of the municipal council. This is a demonstration of sorts that network governance prevails and that aldermen are linked into civic society, reducing their dependency on municipal government information sources. In the current study it can be predicted that parliamentarians will access a range of informal sources of information and more specifically performance metrics. For example a local media campaign may be used by a parliamentarian as their source of performance information on a local hospital, rather than the data produced by the hospital itself or a central audit agency. Ho concluded that performance measurement tools were perceived positively, but their impact was dependent on the extent of integration into the city’s planning system, the quality of communication between elected representatives and departmental staff and also whether stakeholders were involved in developing performance measures. This is a factor which will also be examined in the current project.

Bogt acknowledged but was unable to examine the possibility that aldermen’s opinions and their use of information could be influenced by their educational backgrounds, professional experience in previous jobs and political backgrounds. The current project will examine this further, seeking to explore the extent to which individual and party backgrounds appear to impact on performance metrics usage patterns. 

Bogt also raised the intriguing possibility that performance information usage behaviour can be explained by the concept of  ‘political efficiency’ – which claims  conscious calculations are made by politicians over the commitment of various effort that can be made to attract voters in elections. Bogt observed that politicians may conclude that members of particular interest groups and other citizens, who are the voters, do not judge politicians only or primarily in terms of economic efficiency. In the context of health service policy in Scotland, parliamentarians are likely to be acutely aware of the way in which voters will interpret policies in their constituencies. For example support for an efficient, economic and effective policy of centralising neurological services in one Scottish hospital may be highly politically inefficient in the sense that difficult and time consuming justifications would be required to protect votes in constituencies where neurological facilities were earmarked for closure. Bogt’s discussion of political efficiency raises wider questions related to the economics of performance metrics usage by parliamentarians. Parliamentarians we can assume are utility maximisers. It is logical to presume that at some level a calculation goes on in the minds of parliamentarians, when faced with the possibility of reviewing a set of performance metrics along lines comprehensible in terms of opportunity costs and transaction costs. To some extent other means of engaging with issues of a more ‘sentimental’ or subjective kinds are likely to be considered.

Askim found that over 70% of councilors thought performance information was important in agenda setting, although not so significant as ‘input from the local population. Askim was also able to produce evidence as to the respective popularity of different sources of information, concluding that performance information contained in annual reports and balanced scorecards was preferred over national data bases or ‘local surveys’.  When asked to consider the importance of performance information for evaluating the implementation of the municipal authorities policies, 72% of Askim’s respondents reported that it gave them a good idea of the population’s needs were being met. A further 65% also agreed that performance information gave them an ability to identify parts of the service that were not performing to satisfaction.  Askim was also able to differentiate between the attitudes of councilors with responsibilities for different policy areas in respect of the utility of performance information. Claimed utilization was
higher among councillors working with elderly care, administrative affairs, and educational affairs than among councillors working with cultural affairs, technical services and planning and commercial development. The link between policy area and performance metrics utilization is therefore an issue which should be considered in the current study. Health care is assumed to have generated a greater depth of performance information than other policy sectors in the United Kingdom.

Institutional context
Ezzamel et al, Johnson and Talbot and Sterk Bouckaert all pay significant attention to the legislative institutions structure and working practices in the parliaments they examine. While Askim provides little information on institutional context, the attention given to the linkage between policy area and utilization is of significance. The current study incorporates appreciation of institutional background into the research process. The Scottish parliamentary system where the current study is located has required political parties to form governing coalitions. So far - Labour and the Liberal Democrats, between 1999-2007 and currently a minority SNP-Green Party coalition have formed governments. Both Johnson and Talbot and Sterk and Bouckaert point to the dominance of the executive power in the budget process and conclude this prevents reforms realising their oversight enhancing aims. In the context of the current study executive dominance is a factor which must be taken in to account in relation to the analysis of documents and in interviews.

Methods




The analysis presented below relates to the contributions of parliamentarians to meetings of the Health and Community Care Committee to Sessions 1 and 2 of the Scottish Parliament 1999-2003 and 2003-2007. Session 1 saw 99 meetings taking place.  A total of 431 uses of performance metrics were recorded. In Session 2 a total of 114 meetings were held and 210 uses or performance metrics recorded.

In 1999 the Committee had initially ten members and a convener, reduced to seven members, a convener and deputy convener in 2003. The convener was a nominee of the Liberal Democrats, the junior partner in the governing coalition. Rules determined that the Labour Party as the largest group in the Parliament was allowed to nominate five members, reduced to four in 2003. The next biggest party in the Parliament, the Scottish Nationalists nominated three members, reduced to two in 2003. The Conservatives were initially allocated two places on the Committee, reduced to one in 2003. Independents filled the remaining places. The Committee’s party membership structure continued on the same basis in Session two but with an SNP convener throughout. In attempting to understand behaviour in relation to the use of performance metrics a content analysis was conducted on the basis of identifying different types of usage. With a view to conducting comparative work at a later date, the initial categories used in the analysis were kept as simple as possible, in order that the study could be replicated in a different parliamentary institution. The initial content analysis reported here, is based on identifying who used a performance metric, when and why? 

Firstly a record was kept of occasions when a committee member made a minuted intervention on the basis of a figure derived from a specific set of metrics. 

A record was also kept of contributions where a member made reference to a set of metrics but did not actually quote a specific number, percentage or ranking. Where a member made a request for a set of metrics relating to an issue under discussion a record was kept. 

Lastly a record was kept of occasions when a member asked for an explanation to be provided on the conceptual or technical basis upon which a performance metric was collected or presented. This last category also includes interventions where members made outright challenges to the integrity of performance metrics. 

  
Tables 2-4 summarise the data collected on the basis described above​[2]​.

When a parliamentarian uses a performance metric to make a point it is of significance in suggesting that a line of evidence based reasoning is at work. Such interventions also provide proof that parliamentarians have knowledge of a particular set of metrics. The extent of the knowledge may to some extent be indicated by the level of detail provided in specific interventions in committee meetings. Committee members made performance metrics related interventions recorded on the basis outlined, on a total of 425 occasions during Session I of the Parliament and on 210 occasions in Session II.
Dealing firstly with metrics based interventions, initially in Session 1 a trend appeared to exist in that such actions had increased to a stable level by 2002; however this came to an abrupt halt thereafter. In 2003 no metrics based interventions were made at all. The data from Session 2 confirms the decreasing incidence of metrics based interventions. The decrease in the total of 168 metrics based interventions in Session 1 to 90 in Session 2 is certainly significant. Any impact in terms of increased inclination to employ performance metrics, resulting from declining information search cost, enhanced knowledge management or increased individual understanding of performance issues, appears to be outweighed by other factors. The research design allows an appreciation of context to be built up. It is apparent on inspection of the agenda followed by the Committee that it’s dual role as legislative and oversight body creates a conflict over the time allocated to respective roles. Notably during 2003 Session I the Committee dealt with the Primary Medical Services (Scotland) Bill over the course of many sessions. In 2006 a great deal of Committee time was taken up with the Adult Support and Protection (Scotland) Bill. The evidence demonstrates that performance metrics are not employed in the process of legislative scrutiny. 
Table 2. Incidence of metrics based interventions in committee meetings.

















As witnesses appeared before the committee to answer questions to inquiries and defend policies, it was expected that MSPs would realise that they did not possess key information needed to conduct a satisfactory scrutiny. Asking for sets of metrics is an important action in that it can identify a parliamentarian as acknowledging that they lack sufficient evidence to address the issue in hand, or alternately that they think they have identified a specific missing piece in the story being presented to them. It is therefore important to know how frequently committee members made a request indicating they had thought about a problem in metrics based terms. In the initial committee sessions which took place in 1999 a surprisingly small number of requests were made for sets of metrics to be provided. The 1999 figure of five requests (Table 3) probably reflect the novelty of tasks associated with the new parliament, with members needing time to orientate themselves to the task of oversight. In 2000 a total of 17 requests were made for information. In 2001 the number of requests was again 17. Once again it is important to investigate the context in which requests for metrics were being made. The annual budget scrutiny process mainly took place during three meetings, which alone generated nine requests for metrics. In 2001, scrutiny of the budget process accounted for six of the 17 recorded requests for sets of metrics to be provided. However from 2004 onwards the inclination to ask for performance metrics to be provided as a means of understanding how effectively money was being spent in the NHS and community care field was in decline. It is pertinent to ask why the Committee as a whole became less interested in requesting performance metrics from the Finance Department. One explanation might be that the information gaps had been filled. The following extract form a Committee meeting in 2004 would suggest caution in accepting this explanation:

Committee member 2004 (Labour) 
It is hard to believe how quickly budget scrutiny sessions come round; it does not seem that it is a year since we last did a similar exercise. One of the points that I want to make is that in both 2002 and 2003 the Health Committee reviewed the budget and made recommendations. During the years in which I have been on the committee, we have always made recommendations. However, as far as we can tell, the majority of those recommendations have not been acted upon. Indeed, our budget adviser informs us that no more than perhaps two or three of the 17 recommendations have been addressed. For the benefit of the committee, will you explain what processes are in place to consider the recommendations that subject committees make about the spending of the various Executive departments? What processes does the Scottish Executive Health Department have for considering and acting on our recommendations and for feeding back to us the progress that has been made?

Table 3. Requests by committee members for performance metrics to be provided.


















The implication is that the Finance Department either chooses not to respond to requests for new sets of performance metrics, or equally plausible, is unable to develop the metrics sets in question. In either case the will of the Committee appears to have been gradually broken in respect of demanding performance metrics. The constitutional rules governing the relationship between Scottish Parliament Subject Committees and the Government provide no basis for calling the Finance Minister to account over the failure to respond to requests for performance metrics. 












Table 4. Challenges to basis of metrics provided, demands for explanation and claims of inaccessibility.

Performance concepts and perspectives adopted by parliamentarians

















Parliamentarians tend to adopt three basic positions in relation to performance metrics in the act of oversight over the Scottish Government. Firstly there are times when members behave as if they accept the conditions on which data is collected, analysed and presented. As users they are taking sets of metrics at face value – reading the performance story in literal terms. This is the ‘mystic’ position. (Table 2. Above) On the other hand parliamentarians may demonstrate through their use of metrics that they  are still at one with the metrification system but want to make new rules to reconcile their doubts over the accuracy or completeness of the performance story. The rules take the form of new metrics. In this mode the parliamentarians can be classified as ‘moralisers’. (Table 3. Above) Alternately parliamentarians do not accept the legitimacy of the performance metrics produced by state. They position themselves as ‘disbelievers’ and use references to performance metrics to develop a discourse of doubt. (Table 4. above) The parliamentarians examined did not align exclusively with one position; they will generally adopt any of the three positions when it suits. 

Limitations 
The performance concepts recognised and employed by Scottish parliamentarians are wide ranging and often of some notable sophistication. On the other hand it is also apparent that there are limitations both on an individual parliamentarian’s capacity or inclination to use performance metrics. Evidence based oversight may be undermined, blocked or encouraged by various factors which have been alluded to in the literature review and discussion of provisional results in this paper. At the current stage in the research process institutional, economic, cognitive capacity and committee capability in respect of knowledge management provide explanations of behaviour which are of particular interest in explaining why use of performance metrics is limited. The positioning patterns identified, along with the ‘limiting’ factors referred to above explain why performance is conceived in a particular way by this group of parliamentarians.
Institutional factors. 
The Scottish Parliament’s committee system attracts special attention given that it was a key component in the ‘not like Westminster’ design instruction for the parliament. (Keating, 2005) It was hoped by certain of the Scottish Parliament’s architects that strong committees would foster consensus, with an emphasis on reducing partisanship and adopting a pragmatic approach to the detailed study of draft legislation. The evidence relating to this aspiration is mixed but in general suggests that the balance of power inclines strongly in favor of ministers. (Arter, 2002; Shephard & Cairney, 2004; Shephard & Cairney, 2005; Cairney, 2006) Interviews with Committee memebers indicate a strong attachment to partisan political action. The electoral strength of the parties in Scotland, their ideological character and policies, and the patterns of interaction between the parties are significant factors in the use of performance metrics by MSPs (Bennie and Clark 2003). Another variable worth considering in relation to the way MSPs use performance metrics, is the condition of NHS provision in their constituency. An MSP whose local hospital is faced with closure or downgrading may have a different attitude to HPMs than would be the case in more stable circumstances. 
The structure of parliamentary institutions as might be expected influence the extent to which performance metrics will be employed in oversight. For example the Scottish Parliament has dual purpose subject committees which conduct oversight of government run services such as health but are also charged with the job of conducting detailed scrutiny of bills as they pass through the legislative process. In Wales the two roles have been separated allowing for more time to be devoted to the scrutiny of services. This latter role offers far more potential to use performance metrics and other quantified evidence. Overload is cited as a reason for not using performance metrics by Committee members interviewed as part of this study. 
The relationship between the Scottish Parliament and the producers of performance metrics appeared to be fairly slight on the basis of the content analysis of Committee minutes conducted. In interviews it became apparent that consistent with the evidence collected in the content analysis, that reports produced by the key audit agency performance metrics producers  for the health and community care sector – Audit Scotland and NHS Quality Improvement Scotland – featured only episodically in the oversight actions of parliamentarians serving on the Committee. To some extent this is explained by a structural quirk in the Scottish Parliament system which gives the Audit Committee referral powers over the reports produced by this body. Faced with an Audit Scotland report the Audit Committee has four options:  to simply note, refer to a subject committee, ask for further evaluation or set up an inquiry. The option of referring a health related report to the health and Community Care Committee is very rarely exercised. An Audit Scotland interviewee commented that he would have liked to see complex health and community care reports examined by the specialist oversight committee, which might able to fully digest the evidence. Audit Scotland staff are always in attendance at Audit Committee meeting. They had no requirement to attend the Health and Community Care Committee and in practice only provided occasional briefing sessions in private. The offer of ad hoc briefings on Audit Scotland reports only appear to have been taken up by the Health and Community Care when the subject matter coincided with an ongoing agenda item. Without a statutory relationship to the Health and Community Care Committee, Audit Scotland  rely on individual members of the  Health and Community Care Committee reading either the full report or using its key message summaries.  Audit Scotland must demonstrate that it consults with relevant stakeholders over its programme of investigations.  Every 18 months they produce a ‘long list’ which goes out for consultation. The Scottish Parliament’s Audit Committee and subject committee clerks participate in the consultation. The Parliamentary committees have no particular privileges in the consultation process. It also appears that the elected representatives have played a relatively small part in this exercise in comparison with parliamentary officials.
Interviews indicate that the specialist health services audit agency – NHS Quality Improvement Scotland has basically the same relationship with the Health and Community Care Committee. An interview with a member of staff confirmed that there are no rules of engagement for NHS Quality Improvement Scotland with committees or individual MSPs. A Committee member suggested in an interview that the relationship between NHS Quality Improvement Scotland and the Committee touched ‘raw nerves’. The same respondent pointed out that a quarterly newsletter previously sent to all MSPs had ceased publication before the last election. The explanation given by the interviewee was that the then Health Minister was uncomfortable with the idea of ‘his’ NHS Quality Improvement Scotland providing ammunition for opposition parties to critcise the NHS for which he was responsible. Questioned on the potential conflict between responsibilities to the government and individual parliamentarians and NHS Quality Improvement Scotland, a respondent acknowledged that the issue had not been satisfactorily resolved. NHS Quality Improvement Scotland – Health and Community Care Committee relations were described as ‘distant’ by another respondent. There appears to have been only one Committee convener who has felt it necessary to cultivate a relationship with NHS Quality Improvement Scotland. Another respondent revealed that it would be relatively easy for NHS Quality Improvement Scotland to make constituency level reports available to each MSP providing a full range of performance metrics relevant to their needs in respect of oversight. 

 When individual MSPs contact NHS Quality Improvement Scotland for information they tend to have a very specific issue in mind. NHS Quality Improvement Scotland receives around 20-30 letters from MSPs each year and quite often they are written in reference to a particular individual in their constituency. As an indicator of the relative lack of sophistication in respect of concepts of performance used in oversight, neither parliament officials, NHS Quality Improvement Scotland nor members of the Committee thought that much behaviour was paid to clinical governance derived data. 
A further institutional constraint on the use of performance metrics is the level of research support afforded to parliamentarians operating in an oversight capacity. The Health and Community Care Committee is serviced by a clerking team of two/three who can provide basic information on where information might be found and which experts might be of use in relation to an agenda item. The Scottish Parliament has a research department (SPICE) which is at the disposal of MSPs. SPICE has two health and community care specialists. Interviews indicate that SPICE is the main source of research support for Committee members outside of the government coalition. Committee members who were members of the government coalition parties, particularly Labour members, appear to have had at least some privileged access via ministers to the research capability of the Health Department and the Analytic Services Division of the Scottish Executive (now called Scottish Government under the new SNP-Green coalition). Conservative Party members of the Committee had access to a very small but highly valued team of researchers at party headquarters. 
An altogether different type of institutional limitation has also been seen to impose limits on the use of performance metrics. This is related to careers and progress within the political party structures that dominate the Scottish Parliament. Here the ability to demonstrate effective use of performance evidence in oversight roles may not bring with it the prospect of reward in the form of advancement to a ministerial position for members of government coalition parties. It is also distinctly likely that for some Committee members the task of scrutinising government was not perceived as an activity which would bring personal advancement. In fact there is a strong likelihood that ambitious Labour members, seeing themselves as ‘ministers in waiting’, would avoid using performance metrics based interventions and more generally constrain the scope of their executive oversight role. Members sometimes appear to be conscious of following party tactics in committee work, which would suggest further limits are placed on how performance is conceived.
Economic 

The use of performance metrics can be conceived in economic terms. Information and knowledge of the type derived from comprehending performance metrics has a value to the parliamentarian. However, there are associated costs which can be conceptualised in economic terms. For example there is an associated ‘opportunity cost’.  Stated simply if a parliamentarian spends time working up a familiarity with one a particular set of performance metrics then they are not using their time on some other activity, for example attending social events in their constituency where they will be visible to potential voters. There are also transaction costs to be considered by the parliamentarian in deciding whether to investigate a set of performance metrics. Parliamentarians may be subject to some of the general rules of transaction economics as proposed by Williamson (1981) in respect of their use of performance metrics. For example a firm will not ‘vertically integrate’ a service which is rarely used in its business process, instead it will buy in the service from an external source who can offer a better and cheaper service. On the other hand it may make sense to carry out activities in-house if they are used frequently to improve quality and cost. An analogous choice for the parliamentarian is whether to regularly review an audit agencies metrics on a particular subject or to only review when a specific need or opportunity arises in committee business. The former option carries with it a cost, while the latter only incurs a cost on an episodic basis. The former option should ensure that a historical knowledge is acquired and also produce a more sophisticated appreciation of the methodology and detail of the metric set. On the other hand there is an ongoing cost with no guarantee of benefit. Occasional review may be desirable if the ‘transaction’ costs can be minimised without loss of quality of the information gained. It is worth considering whether certain producers of performance metrics succeed in reducing transaction costs through clever formatting and presentation? Interviews with Committee members suggest that Audit Scotland achieves this reduction in cost to some extent with its key message briefings.  More frequently Committee members report referring to the two page ‘summaries’ of reports provided by interest groups such as the BMA (medical doctors association) and RCN (nurses association), acknowledging in effect that a transaction cost has been removed from the process of acquiring performance metrics based evidence. 
Limits imposed by cognitive capacity. 
The third factor which limits the use of performance metrics can be termed cognitive capacity. Health and community care services are complex. Members of the Committee start with widely differing abilities to comprehend performance issues, a conclusion drawn from the content analysis of meetings conducted and confirmed in interviews. To some extent this is reflected in individual performance metric scores. In total three physicians, a nurse, a pharmacist, an NHS IT officer, a community care worker and a social worker have served on the Committee. Members with some health or community care practitioner experience gained prior to election as an MSP have indicated in interviews that their capacity to act effectively has been enhanced by a pre-existing knowledge of process and practice. Nevertheless, it should not be taken for granted that, for example a medical background would be of immediate benefit in understanding how to use performance metrics. As one medically qualified member acknowledged, she had never had cause to examine the type of data used by the Committee as a clinician.  Another medically qualified member talked about having to stop looking at issues from a doctor’s point of view and consciously think like a politician.  The opportunity afforded to individual Committee members to ‘acclimatise’ to the health policy environment is limited. No training is provided either by the parliament or as interviews indicate, the political parties. This in turn accentuates the cognitive limitations (self-acknowledged or indicated in interviews) of parliamentarians in relation to conceptualising performance. Limits are therefore imposed on the range of performance concepts which members employ in the act of oversight. While tenure is often relatively short, a few parliamentarians have built up four or more years of experience on the committee. One member with no prior practitioner experience had clearly become an expert in conducting oversight of health and community care services and used performance metrics constantly in meetings. The record of use generally though strongly suggest most MSPs find it hard to comprehend performance metrics and how they relate to issues the committee deals with.  A related possibility is that certain MSPs are far more comfortable with non-evidenced arguments, based on sentiment. This type of argument may be perceived by MSPs to be more effective in securing local support. Rich information conveyed through personal contacts may be preferred. One MSP acknowledged that she was not a ‘digger’ and didn’t bother with the ‘internet’ to gather information. On the other hand she claimed to have a strong network which could be readily accessed for relevant evidence. Another member talked in broadly similar terms, although emphasising individual contacts more than links to organizations. The ‘alternatives’ to performance metrics – experience, testimony, conversation, comonsense understandings, professional ‘lore’ and ordinary everyday assumptions  have all featured in explanations given by members in the course of interviews. Respondents are also indicating that performance metrics need to be assimilated into the performance concepts  which parliamentarians are already using  before it impacts on. This was a factor noted by representatives of audit agencies who took part in interviews. Reports tended only to be referred to in an oversight context  if the the Committee or an individual already had the issues dealt with and associated performance concepts on their agenda. 
In explaining the limitations individuals experience in evidence based thinking Fox’s (2007) explanation of the process of ‘argumentation’ is useful in explaining the limitations on parliamentarians’ interest in evidence such as performance metrics.  For data to be useful it needs to be utilised in an ‘acceptable argument’.   Mathematical probability constitutes strong evidence in an argument, but in a public policy context it is often the case that there are insufficient previous cases from which to construct quantified estimates. Subjective probability, which is often based on what experts tell a parliamentary committee, may be deemed acceptable. This makes the need to draw on quantified evidence in the form of performance metrics less crucial. 

Another factor which cannot be ignored in relation to cognitive capacity is the quality and depth of research support available to members. At least one researcher was employed by each of the MSPs who sat on the Committee. All of the interviewees have acknowledged that political and personal loyalty was as much of a factor in recruitment as evidence of ability to conduct research. In so far as could be discovered through interviews, the quality of ‘researcher’ varies considerably. 

Limits on use placed by the knowledge management capability of the committee.
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^1	  An extensive literature review has been conducted as part of the ESRC Public Services Programme Fellowship held by the author. It will be available at: http://www.publicservices.ac.uk/category/research/
^2	  Following the completion of the content analysis, the classifications were re-examined to ensure rules developed on a case law basis had been applied appropriately throughout the content analysis stage of the research programme.
